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,ARTICLE 
THE UNEXCEPTIONAL 
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS RUDs 
JACK GOLDSMITH* 
The United States helped create international human rights law, much 
of which reflects principles developed under the U.S. Constitution. It has 
been an enthusiastic supporter of the international human rights law move-
ment for decades. And it has ratified four of the most important interna-
tional human rights treaties: the Genocide Convention, the Torture 
Convention (CAT), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (CERD). 
But the United States has also consistently attached conditions to these 
treaty ratifications, in the form of reservations, understandings, and declara-
tions (RUDs). These RUDs have "evoked criticism abroad and dismayed 
supporters of ratification in the United States,,,1 and have provoked the 
charge that U.S. ratifications of human rights treaties with RUDs are "spe-
cious, meretricious, hypocritical.,,2 Critics complain that the reservations 
that are "designed to reject any obligation to rise above existing law and 
practice are of dubious propriety,"3 and lead "[e]ven friends of the United 
States [to object] that its reservations are incompatible,,4 with the treaties' 
object and purpose to promote human rights through the assumption of uni-
versal human rights norms. In addition, the "U.S. practice of declaring 
human rights conventions non-self-executing is commonly seen as of a 
piece with the other RUDs,"5 and "confirms that United States adherence 
* Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. For helpful comments, I 
thank Mark Mosier, Alexander Slater, and Conor McCarthy; participants at the Carr Center re-
search seminar (especially Michael Ignatieff), Georgetown Law School, and Harvard Law School 
workshops; and the University of St. Thomas School of Law symposium. 
1. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Treaties: The Ghost of Senator Brickel', 
89 Am. J. IntI. L. 341, 341 (1995). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 343. 
4. Id. 
5. /d. at 346. 
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remains essentially empty"6 and that "the United States does not take 
[human rights treaties] seriously as international obligations."7 Professor 
Henkin sums up the conventional wisdom when he concludes that "U.S. 
[human rights treaty] ratification practice threatens to undermine a half-cen-
tury of effort to establish international human rights standards as interna-
tionallaw."8 
This essay seeks to deflate some of this conventional wisdom about the 
U.S. RUDs practice. Most of the essay is devoted to showing that, as a 
descriptive matter, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the U.S. RUDs 
are not unique, even among liberal democracies. Rather, as parts I and II 
show, the U.S. RUDs practice is functionally similar to the practice of other 
liberal democracies (including European liberal democracies) which, like 
the United States, take reservations to important human rights treaties, de-
cline to make these treaties domestically enforceable, and generally show a 
preference for local and regional human rights norms and institutions over 
international ones. Part III of the essay then sketches an explanation and 
defense of this practice. 
I. THE UNEXCEPTIONAL U.S. RESERVATIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS 
Reservations and understandings are ways that States qualify consent 
to treaties. Reservations are acts of nonconsent to particular treaty terms.9 
Understandings are "interpretive statements that clarify or elaborate"l0 the 
meaning of particular treaty terms as understood by the consenting State. In 
examining the U.S. practice of imposing reservations and understandings, I 
will focus attention on the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), "the cornerstone of modern international human rights 
law."ll The ICCPR is the best treaty to study in connection with the excep-
tionalist charge, because it is the most important and comprehensive human 
rights treaty, touching on every conceivable political and civil right. 
The U.S. consented to almost all of the provisions in the ICCPR. It 
took reservations to four provisions: the limitations on capital punishment, 
the prohibition on hate speech and war propaganda, the rule that a convicted 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 348. 
8. Id. at 349. 
9. Congo Research Serv., Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. 
Senate, Sen. Comm. Print 106-71 at 125 (Jan. 2, 2001) (available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo. 
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_conR-senate_print&docid=f:66922.pdf) [hereinafter CRS 
Study] (defining reservations as "specific qualifications or stipulations that modify U.S. obliga-
tions without necessarily changing the treaty language"); cf Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 2(1)(d) (May 23, 1969), 8 I.L.M. 679, 681 (defining reservation as "purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that 
State"). 
10. CRS Study, supra n. 9, at 125. 
11. William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party? 21 Brook. J. IntI. L. 277, 277 (1995). 
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criminal can take advantage of postconviction sentence reductions, and the 
prohibition on treating juveniles as adults. In addition, the United States 
made clear its understanding that certain provisions that it did consent to-
the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; certain rules 
concerning discrimination and the right to counsel; the process of compen-
sating those wrongly convicted; and certain aspects of double jeopardy-
were no more stringent than analogous rules under the U.S. Constitution. 12 
These reservations and understandings had overwhelming bipartisan 
support. 13 
There is nothing unusual about the practice of imposing reservations to 
human rights treaties to conform the treaty obligations to the contours of 
domestic law. To the contrary, the practice is common. Over one-third of 
the parties to the ICCPR have qualified their consent to the ICCPR through 
reservations or understandings to all but one of the rights provisions in the 
ICCPR. 14 This means that the U.S. ICCPR reservations and understandings, 
though a minority practice, are not especially unusual. 
The practice seems significantly less unusual when we consider the 
identities of the parties that make reservations and understandings, and con-
template why they may do so. As the following chart demonstrates, liberal 
democratic nations that tend to respect human rights and international law 
tend to ratify the ICCPR with reservations and understandings; nonliberal 
democracies that tend less to respect human rights and international law do 
not attach reservations to the ICCPR. It turns out that U.S. reservations and 
understandings are not materially different than ones taken by other liberal 
democracies. 
12. Off. U.N. High Comm. for Human Rights, For the Record, United Nations, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://www.hrLca/fortherecord2003/documentation/reser-
vations/ccpr.htm (2003) [hereinafter For the RecordJ. 
13. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights and Conditional Con-
sent, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399,414-16 (2000). 
14. Yogesh Tyagi, The Conflict of Law and Policy on Reservations to Human Rights Trea-
ties, 71 British Y.B. IntI. L. 181, 187 n. 18 (2000). 
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RESERVATIONS, UNDERSTANDINGS, AND DECLARATIONS CRUDs) TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. l5 
States RUDs 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Austria 
France, Netherlands, Trinidad and Tobago 
Monaco, Switzerland 
Belgium, Italy, Malta 
Denmark, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg 
Bangladesh, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Thailand, Turkey 
Algeria, Australia, Belize, Finland, India, Kuwait, Sweden 
Botswana, Guyana, Romania, South Korea, Syrian Arab Republic 
Afghanistan, Argentina, Barbados, Bulgaria, Congo, Gambia, Guinea, Hungary, 
Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mongolia, Russian Federation, 
Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen 
Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote 
D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maui, Mauritius, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, POitugal, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San 
Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, 
16 
12 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Zambia, Zimbabwe 0 
IS. This chart was previously published as Table 4.2 in Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, 
The Limits of International Law 129 (Oxford U. Press 2005). 
This table was derived from four sources: (I) the most recent RUDs collection for 
the ICCPR that we could find, see www.hrLca/fortherecord@2003/documentation/ 
reservations/ccpr.@htm; (2) a United Nations collection of RUDs to the Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which also contains necessary information on 
RUDs to the ICCPR for some states, see www.unhrchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ 
treaty4_asp.htm; (3) the latest United Nations information we could find on ratification 
of the ICCPR, see www.unhrchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf; and (4) a source indicating 
Swaziland's status as an ICCPR party, see web.anmesty.orglweb/wire.nsf/June20041 
Swaziland. All of these sources were last visited on August 16, 2004. 
Counting reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) is difficult and 
requires judgment calls. For this table, we counted only those RUDs that actually 
qualify state consent to the ICCPR. This means, for example, that we did not count the 
United States declaration that the ICCPR is non-self-executing. A more vexing problem 
is how to count a RUD that qualifies consent to two parts of one article in a treaty. 
Where the two references within the same article are closely related, we conservatively 
count this as a single RUD. For example, Finland, Iceland, and other states reserve the 
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Consider the United Kingdom. It opted out of the ICCPR's rights to (a) 
free expression and assembly, to the extent that these rights conflicted with 
extant UK legislation; (b) free legal assistance, in certain places; (c) equal-
ity of marriage rights, when doing so conflicted with local domicile law; (d) 
vote and serve in public office, in various contexts; (e) segregate juvenile 
and adult prisoners, both convicted and accused; (1) freedom from impris-
onment for contract violations, in Jersey; (g) freedom from arbitrary depri-
vation of the right to enter one's own country, to the extent that it conflicted 
with extant UK immigration law; (h) require that children have a national-
ity, to the extent that this right conflicted with extant UK law; and (i) to 
avoid marriage "without the free and full consent of the intending spouses" 
for customary marriages in the Solomon Islands. In addition, the UK 
broadly reserved the right to apply to certain persons (including military 
personnel and lawfully detained persons) "such laws and procedures as they 
may from time to time deem to be necessary for the preservation of service 
and custodial discipline."16 
Similarly, France entered several reservations and understandings to 
qualify its consent to the ICCPR. It declined to consent to the ICCPR's 
limitation on emergency powers to the extent the limitation might affect 
French presidential power and other aspects of French domestic law. It 
opted out of an array of criminal procedure rights insofar as they applied to 
"the disciplinary regime in the armies." It insisted on the right to "make 
limited exceptions" to the right to have one's conviction and sentence re-
viewed by a higher tribunal. It declined consent to the requirements for 
expelling aliens to the extent that this requirement conflicted with extant 
French law. It made clear that various rights of expression, assembly, and 
association in the ICCPR must conform to the free expression rights in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. It limited its consent to the ICCPR prohibition on "propaganda 
for war" to legal Will'S, and stated that it understood this provision to be no 
more demanding than French law in any event. And finally, France declined 
its consent to the ICCPR provision that guaranteed "ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic minorities" the right to "enjoy their own culture, to profess and prac-
tice their own religion, or to use their own language" in light of Article 2 of 
right to ignore the juvenile segregation provisions in articles 10(2) and 10(3); we 
counted this as a single RUD. Similarly, many EU states qualify their acceptance of 
articles 19, 21, and 22 by stating that they accept only those portions that are not in 
conflict with European human rights treaties; again, this is treated as one RUD. In 
addition, when a state qualifies its consent without specific reference to a provision in 
the treaty, this is counted as a single RUD. This occurs, for example, when countries 
declare that ratification does not entail recognition of the state of Israel. Even with these 
guiding principles, some of our interpretations were, at the margins, difficult. Any 
disagreements at the margins, however, do not affect the overall pattern of the table, 
which clearly demonstrates that liberal states are Illuch more inclined than nonliberal 
states to condition consent to the ICCPR with RUDs. 
Id. at 231 n. 1. 
16. See For the Record, supra n. 12. 
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the French Constitution, called "On Sovereignty," which specifies (among 
other things) that the language of the Republic shall be FrenchP 
Other prominent European liberal democracies-the Netherlands (8), 
Switzerland (8), Austria (6), Belgium (6), Italy (6), Germany (4), Liechten-
stein (5), Iceland (4), Ireland (4), Denmark (3), and Finland (3)-have 
made numerous reservations/understandings to the ICCPR. 18 These reserva-
tions cover many topics, including various trial rights, free speech rights, 
immigration rights, and voting rights. 19 
In addition to these extensive ICCPR reservations/understandings, in-
ternationallaw and human-rights-Ioving European States use other mecha-
nisms to favor regional community norms and institutions over the 
universal ICCPR and its associated institutions. Several rights contained in 
the ICCPR-including the right of self-determination, the rights of aliens 
against expulsion, and the right of ethnic and other minorities to enjoy their 
own culture, religion, and language-have no counterpart in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols.20 Nonetheless, the EU and 
EU States have developed a variety of procedures-including "same mat-
ter" reservations, and declarations to Article 41 of the ICCPR-designed to 
steer human rights complainants away from international bodies like the 
ICCPR Human Rights Committee, and toward the regional EU system.21 
These procedures result in the systematic underenforcement of ICCPR 
norms when they conflict with EU norms or with State laws that are the 
subjects of a reservation or declaration?2 The ICCPR Human Rights Com-
mittee has complained about "the apparent preference accorded, in domestic 
law [of EU states] as well as in legal doctrine and jurisprudence, to the 
European Convention ... as against the [ICCPR],"23 and has recommended 
that EU States alter their constitutions to reflect the provisions of the 
ICCPR.24 The EU has ignored this recommendation. 
In addition to this systematic exclusion of the ICCPR from the Euro-
pean human rights system, the European Court of Human Rights (and its 
predecessor, the European Commission) engage in the functionally similar 
17. [d. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. 
20. See Tyagi, supra n. 14, at 208 n. 106; A.H. Robertson, The United Nations Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, 43 British Y.B. IntI. L. 
21, 37-40 (1968-1969); Hellenic Resources Network, European Convention On Human Rights 
and its Five Protocols, http://www.hri.org/docsIECHR50.html (Sept. 27, 1995). 
21. See Tyagi, supra n. 14, at 195-96, 206-08. 
22. See id. at 205-13 (documenting many examples). 
23. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee Vol. ['II 76, U.N. 
Doc. N49/40 (Sept. 21, 1994) (supplement to volume I). 
24. See id. at ~['II 80, 123, 128; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights 
Committee Vol. /I 'Il'Il 61, 184, U.N. Doc. N54/40 (Jan. 1, 2000); U.N. Human Rights Comm., 
Report of the Human Rights Committee Vol. /1'1165, U.N. Doc. AI52/40 (Jan. 1, 1999); see gener-
ally Tyagi, supra n. 14, at 208-09. 
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practice of embracing national or regional human rights norms and rejecting 
more rights-protecting human rights treaty standards when the two conflict. 
These bodies have, for example, interpreted European law to provide nar-
rower protections than the ICCPR, as interpreted by the ICCPR Human 
Rights Committee, in areas ranging from conscientious objection, to due 
process guarantees for civil servants, to the right of privacy in connection 
with religious practices.25 
In these and many other ways, European States engage in practices 
functionally similar to U.S. RUDs-practices that have the effect of exclud-
ing the ICCPR when it conflicts with European understandings about the 
proper content of and enforcement mechanism for human rights. One 
might try to deflect the significance of the point by arguing that Europe's 
chauvinistic rejection of international norms and institutions, unlike the 
United States', sometimes (though not always or even usually) takes place 
in favor of a regional system that is itself constituted by international law. 
After all, the EU States developed this regional human rights system after 
concluding that domestic instituitions could not prevent reoccurrence of the 
atrocities committed in World War II. One might think that the EU States 
are at least beholden to an international institution, albeit a regional one that 
(like the U.S. system) reject full incorporation of ICCPR norms. 
Despite these points, no normative significance attaches, for present 
purposes, to the formalism of a human rights system that is regional and 
supranational as opposed to domestic and supreme. It is unclear whether the 
EU system is properly analyzed as constituted by international law, or 
whether it is better viewed as a transitional, fledgling "domestic" constitu-
tional system (or at least a constitutional community apart from the "inter-
national community") akin to the United States under the Articles of 
Confederation.26 But even assuming (as few do) that the EU is a pure inter-
national law institution, it is still a nonglobal institution that is narrower 
than international institutions like the ICCPR, and its member states are 
bound by global treaties like the ICCPR in all of their actions, including 
their EU-related actions. Just as the United States could not skirt its interna-
tional obligations by entering into a treaty with Canada in which the two 
countries agreed to be bound by a regional court that would apply U.S. 
domestic civil rights law, as a formal matter the EU States and the EU 
system remain governed by the ICCPR and similar institutions. The fact 
that the EU established a human rights system via regional international law 
25. See Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 285, 
331-33 n. 168 (1999). 
26. The emerging conventional wisdom is that it is a constitutional system. See e.g. Paul 
Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union, 7 European L. J. 125 (2001); 
Joseph Weiler, European Constitutionalism: Beyond the State (Cambridge U. Press 2003); J.H.H. 
Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 1 
European L.J. 219, 220-21 (1995). 
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mechanisms rather than through domestic constitutional reform is of no 
consequence from the perspective of the obligations of the ICCPR and re-
lated institutions. For these reasons, the rationale for the critics insisting that 
the United States must fully embrace and domesticate the ICCPR should 
apply with full force to EU States, either at the regional or the national 
level. 
In sum, the practice of European States and of other liberal democra-
cies shows that the U.S. reservation/understanding practice with regard to 
the ICCPR is not exceptional. Neither the number nor the type of U.S. res-
ervations and understandings to the ICCPR differ from the ones made by 
other liberal democracies in Europe and elsewhere. With regard to the U.S. 
reservation/understanding practice and the broader charge of conforming 
international obligations to extant domestic law, the exceptionalism charge 
is simply false. 
II. NON-SELF-EXECUTING DECLARATIONS 
The United States has also attached declarations to all of the major 
human rights treaties except the Genocide Convention. Declarations are 
"statements of purpose, policy, or position related to matters raised by the 
treaty in question but not altering or limiting any of its provisions."27 By far 
the most important and controversial U.S. declaration is the one rendering 
the human rights treaties non-self-executing. This declaration means that 
the human rights treaties are not enforceable by domestic courts unless and 
until the political branches act to make them so. In effect, a non-self-execut-
ing declaration delegates to the U.S. political branches, rather than to U.S. 
courts, the task of implementing international human rights obligations into 
domestic law whenever domestic law fails to satisfy these obligations. 
Non-self-executing declarations are consistent with the human rights 
treaties, which do not require domestic judicial enforcement.28 Moreover, 
the U.S. political branches take seriously their duty to implement interna-
tional human rights law when necessary. Congress has enacted implement-
ing criminal legislation for the Torture Convention and the Genocide 
Convention.29 It also enacted war crimes legislation to satisfy the human 
rights requirements of the Geneva Convention.30 And although Congress 
has never seen fit to implement any parts of the ICCPR, President Clinton 
27. CRS Study, supra n. 9, at 126. 
28. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mt. 2(2} (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976) T.S. 14668 (available at http://www.unhchr.chlhtml/menu31b/a_ccpr.htm); Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 9, 1975). The Human Rights Committee recognizes that the ICCPR 
"generally leaves it to the States parties concerned to choose their method of implementation in 
their territories." U.N. Human Rights Comrn., Article 2, Implementation at the National Level, 
General Comment No.3, at 4 (1994) (thirteenth session of the commission). 
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000), 18 U.S.c. § 1091 (2000). 
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000). 
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issued an order making human rights treaties binding on executive branch 
officials in certain contexts.31 
Setting aside the fact that the United States has in fact domesticated 
some important international obligations, there is nothing exceptional about 
the general U.S. practice of declaring human rights treaties to be non-self-
executing. The majority of ICCPR parties, including many liberal democra-
cies, do not apply the ICCPR in domestic courts.32 For example, all Com-
monwealth countries view all treaties to be non-self-executing. In these 
States, constitutional law prohibits human rights treaties from becoming ju-
dicially enforceable domestic law in the absence of separate implementing 
legislation. Many of these Commonwealth states, and many other "progres-
sive" States that do not automatically incorporate human rights treaties-
including Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom-have not in fact enacted legislation to make the 
ICCPR part of domestic law.33 And many liberal democracies that have 
nominally incorporated the ICCPR into domestic law have no reported de-
cisions of domestic courts relying on this law. In most States that have 
enacted legislation making the ICCPR part of domestic law, courts have not 
relied on the treaty as a source of domestic law. In these nations (which 
include Germany, Mexico, Poland, and Russia) the ICCPR has nominal do-
mestic status but no domestic legal force. 34 
These examples suggest that there is no relationship between (a) do-
mestic incorporation or domestic judicial enforcement of human rights trea-
ties, and (b) human rights practices on the ground.35 This suggestion is 
confirmed by the list of States (such as Algeria, Cambodia, Columbia, 
Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Rwanda, and Syria) that have incorpo-
rated the ICCPR into domestic law but who do not generally respect human 
rights. 36 Even when domestic courts invoke the ICCPR (as in the Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, Nigeria, Senegal, and Venezuela), it is no guarantee 
of a commitment to international human rights or international human 
rights law. 37 In short, incorporation of human rights treaties does not corre-
late with respect for human rights. As Harland wryly notes, "The ICCPR 
31. Exec. Or. 13107,3 C.F.R. 234 (1999). 
32. See Christopher Harland, The Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) in the Domestic Law of State Parties: An Initial Global Survey Through UN 
Human Rights Committee Documents, 22 Human Rights Q. 187 (2000); Christof Heyns & Frans 
Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23 
Human Rights Q. 483 (2001). 
33. Harland, supra n. 32, at 193. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. [d. at 257-60; see U.S. Dept. St., CountlY Reports on Human Rights Practices (available 
at http://www.stale.gov/g/rl/hr/c1470.htm) (last updated Feb. 2005). 
37. Harland, supra n. 32, at 193. 
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does not exist in domestic Swedish law, while in Rwanda, at the time of the 
1994 genocide, the ICCPR ranked above its domestic legislation. "38 
In sum, the U.S. non-self-executing declarations are not uncommon. 
Most nations, including many liberal democracies, have not made the 
ICCPR part of domestic law enforceable by domestic courts. 
III. WHY Do LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES FAIL TO INCORPORATE 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW? 
Parts I and II showed that the United States' practice of declining con-
sent to a small number of provisions in the primary human rights treaties, 
and of rendering these treaties non-self-executing, cannot meaningfully be 
described as "exceptional." Most liberal democracies conform international 
human rights law obligations to the contours of local law via reservations 
and related mechanisms, and many do not permit the treaties to be enforced 
in domestic courts. As Tyagi accurately notes, "It is apparent that, in spite 
of assuming the leadership of the human rights movement, the West re-
mains unwilling to accept international human rights law 
wholeheartedly. "39 
Why would liberal democratic States that are among the most success-
ful in the world in protecting human rights decline to fully embrace the 
international human rights law system? Why has the U.S. critics' preferred 
approach to human rights enforcement-domestic judicial enforcement of 
human rights treaties ratified without qualification-been expressly rejected 
by the two most successful human rights systems in the world (the EU 
system and the U.S. system)? These questions present major and largely 
unconsidered puzzles for the international human rights movement that de-
mand explanation and, if possible, normative justification. This part 
sketches tentative answers. 
1. Respect for International Law 
One possible explanation for reservations to human rights treaties is 
that the reservations evince respect for international law-especially when 
reservations are taken to just a few of many provisions. This was the view 
of Senator Moynihan, a friend of international law.40 He defended the 
ICCPR reservations by noting that the United States "has undertaken a me-
ticulous examination of U.S. practice to insure that the United States will in 
fact comply with the obligations that it is assuming," which "can certainly 
38. Id. 
39. Tyagi, supra n. 14, at 189 (emphasis added). 
40. See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, On the Law of Nations (Harv. U. Press 1990) (arguing for 
strong adherence by the United States to international law). 
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be viewed as an indication of the seriousness with which the obligations are 
regarded rather than as an expression of disdain for the obligations."41 
In the Moynihan view, U.S. RUDs demonstrate that the United States 
has taken great care in examining whether it can conform its domestic be-
havior to the treaty norms, and, on the expectation that it intends to comply, 
it declines consent in the relatively few instances when it cannot. The Moy-
nihan view seems especially compelling because, as figure 1 shows, the 
ICCPR signatories that are least respectful of human rights and interna-
tional law tend not to take any reservations to the ICCPR. 42 
2. Mature Domestic Systems 
The second reason why liberal democracies have rejected the interna-
tionalist approach is that they have flourishing, mature, organic legal pro-
tections for human rights under domestic and regional systems that would 
be jeopardized by the wholesale incorporation of international law. Quite 
simply, the losses of wholesale incorporation of international norms out-
weigh the gains from a human rights perspective. 
Wholesale incorporation of RUD-Iess human rights treaties would in-
ject into the domestic legal system a host of new and differently worded 
norms that would require interpretation and elaboration. The sudden, direct 
application of these new and differently worded norms could affect the do-
mestic civil and political rights system in multiple unforeseen ways, and 
would potentially require reinterpretation and reelaboration of every domes-
tic civil and political right. 
Government officials in liberal democracies could not responsibly su-
perimpose the later-in-time ICCPR system on its organic domestic human 
rights system. The vast majority of the ICCPR's rights are like those guar-
anteed by U.S. domestic constitutional and statutory law-this is why the 
United States ratified the treaty with very few reservations. But to consent 
to the vaguely worded nOlms and promise to act consistent with them is one 
thing; it is something quite different to make these differently worded 
norms subject to litigation in and interpretation by domestic courts. For the 
ICCPR rights are couched in different language than analogous domestic 
U.S. protections. Its differently worded terms would thus lead to litigation 
in every circumstance in which the terms differed. 
Consider one of dozens of possible examples. Article 26(1) of the 
ICCPR provides: 
41. 138 Congo Rec. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). 
42. Cf Arthur Rovine, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and Understandings, in U.S. 
Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties: With or Without Resen1ations? 54, 57 (Richard B. 
Lillich ed., U. Press of Va. 1981) ("It is very easy to sign a human rights treaty without any 
reservations .... Many authoritarian regimes have done so."). 
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All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, 
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all per-
sons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.43 
Imagine the questions that this provision would raise if it were made part of 
domestic law. Would the guarantee of equal protection without "any" dis-
crimination eliminate all forms of affirmative action in the United States? 
Would the guarantee of "effective" in addition to "equal" protection entail 
an effects test for all U.S. discrimination law? What other changes would it 
bring? Would its "protection against discrimination on any ground," includ-
ing "status," extend to discrimination on the basis of homosexuality? Age? 
Weight? Beauty? Intelligence? These are just a few of the broader questions 
raised by Article 26. There are hundreds of other smaller details of domestic 
anti-discrimination law-statutes of limitation, burdens of proof, disparate 
impact analysis, immunity rules, and scores of other case-law intricacies-
that would be open to litigation and potential change. 
It would be easy to walk through the ICCPR and raise hundreds, in-
deed thousands, of similar questions. The answers to these questions might 
change U.S. civil and political rights significantly. Even if U.S. judges in-
terpreted these provisions in accordance with American traditions and expe-
rience, a domesticated ICCPR would create extensive confusion and 
uncertainty, and might change in unpredictable directions. There would be 
litigation over the manifold ways in which the terms of the ICCPR depart 
from domestic law. This litigation would invariably produce some, and per-
haps many, changes in domestic human rights protection. There is no way 
to tell in advance whether these changes would expand or contract domestic 
human rights protections, much less whether the changes would be wise. 
The potential changes to the United States' enormously complex, well-de-
veloped, and largely successful human rights system would be so extensive 
and so uncertain that, I submit, we cannot really imagine responsible politi-
cians embracing these changes. 
This is not just a concern of the United States. It is also why Europe 
has declined to incorporate the ICCPR into its domestic and regional human 
rights regimes. Europe's reasons for preferring the EU system to the ICCPR 
are similar to the reasons why the United States prefers its rights system to 
the international system: because the EU system is older than the ICCPR 
system, because review of EU decisions by ICCPR bodies "might create the 
impression of an 'appeal' from the former to the latter and undermine, or at 
least weaken, the authority of [EU] Institutions," because they worry about 
43. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra n. 28, at art. 26. 
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an overly "liberal interpretation" by the ICCPR Human Rights Committee 
of "some of the general provisions" of the ICCPR, and because "they prefer 
the more exclusive approach of the European Convention, in contrast with 
the thrust of the UN human rights treaties. "44 
There is a larger point here. Liberal democracies decline consent to 
some aspects of international human rights law and resist its wholesale do-
mestic incorporation because the abstract norms in the international treaties, 
if directly incorporated as the RUDs critics would like, would lack local 
legitimacy. RUDs critics would like a direct pipeline from international 
treaties to domestic judicial enforcement, without the intermediating influ-
ences and compromises of democratic politics. In the domestic legal system 
in the United States, both the constitutional and legislative articulation of 
these rights are subject to, and informed by, vigorous public debate and 
influence through the electoral and judge-confirmation processes, among 
others. These democratic influences, in turn, make the human rights that 
emerge from this system legitimate to the citizens who enjoy, and often 
must sacrifice for, these rights. But without such debates and compromises 
and accommodations of vague international norms to local conditions and 
traditions, there is little reason to believe that the people in liberal democra-
cies-at least in the United States-would accept such norms and view 
them as legitimate. 
There is always a tension between legalization of human rights norms 
(whether domestically or internationally) and the resolution of conflicting 
conceptions of human rights through democratic governance. The United 
States has long struggled with this tension, usually in debates about the 
appropriate occasion for and scope of judicial enforcement of fundamental 
constitutional norms. In the past thirty years, the U.S. legal and political 
culture has become increasingly aware of the limitations of judicial control 
of human rights progress, and of the importance (both as a matter of fact, 
and as a normative matter) of democratic deliberation to resolve fundamen-
tal moral issues such as the death penalty, abortion, homosexual rights, dis-
crimination, and the like.45 Although there is much debate about where the 
line between judicial and democratic control should be drawn, the RUDs 
critics embrace an extreme position that rejects the importance of demo-
cratic deliberation altogether, even for rights at the margin of consensus. 
Although internationalist critics of U.S. human rights practices purport to 
be committed to liberal democracy as the optimal form of domestic govern-
44. Tyagi, supra n. 14, at 196, 207-08. 
45. See e.g. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change? (U. of Chicago Press 1991); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away Froll! the 
Courts (Princeton U. Press 1999); Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitu-
tionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford U. Press 2004). 
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ance,46 their RUDs position attempts to isolate human rights enforcement 
from democratic politics altogether. 
Consider only a few of the more obvious differences between the U.S. 
and EU human rights systems-the two most successful such systems in the 
world. The U.S. system developed organically within domestic law. Its de-
tails reflect unique American historical and legal traditions and experiences, 
including (among many other things) the tradition of a written Constitution 
and judicial review, the centrality of slavery and its redress in the Civil 
War, the post-War Amendments, the civil rights revolutions of the twenti-
eth century, and the continuing importance of federalism. Europe's much 
different approach to human rights law is based on entirely different histori-
cal and cultural traditions. If U.S. human rights law has been intimately 
informed by the problem of slavery and race relations, the European system 
has been intimately informed by the catastrophes of World Wars I and II, 
culminating in the horrors of the Holocaust. The post-World War II desire 
for human rights improvement among European States, combined with an 
absence of confidence in domestic institutions to achieve this aim and a 
relatively benign attitude (compared to the United States) toward transna-
tional institutions, led Europeans to establish a human rights system at the 
regional level in combination with other elements of regional integration. 
There are many differences of institutional detail between the two sys-
tems. European rights tend to have less legislative input on the front end 
prior to judicial interpretation, but European Court of Human Rights inter-
pretations of European Convention norms lack direct force within any na-
tional system, but rather must be implemented by local legislatures. By 
contrast, the U.S. legislature has more influence over the creation of rights 
(through legislation and judicial confirmation), but U.S. judicial interpreta-
tions of rights provisions are directly enforceable against federal and state 
officials. 
There are important differences in substantive detail as well. Article 20 
of the ICCPR prohibits "any propaganda for war" and "any advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimina-
tion, hostility or violence."47 These provisions reflect a highly contested 
conception of free speech, one that many ICCPR parties rejected or quali-
fied through reservations and understandings. Similarly contested, even 
among liberal democracies, is the ICCPR's commitment to criminal reha-
bilitation (as opposed to deterrence or incapacitation),48 to the segregation 
of juvenile criminals,49 to a 1960s conception of property rights,50 to 
46. See e.g. Deliberative Democracy and Human Rights (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. 
Slye eds., Yale U. Press 1999). 
47. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra n. 28, at art. 20. 
48. Id. at art. 1O(2)(b). 
49. Id. at art. 10(2). 
50. Id. at art. 1(2). 
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prohibitions on racial and sexual and religious "distinctions of any kind,"51 
and more. 
Most observers would acknowledge that these abstract ICCPR rights 
are not necessarily optimal, and that there might be disagreements over 
whether they are always and everywhere appropriate. But once this possi-
bility is admitted, and once we consider that we live in a world of States 
characterized by radically different rights cultures and legal traditions, radi-
cally different historical experiences, and radically different economic and 
social endowments, it becomes difficult to think that any single system for 
human rights creation and enforcement will always and everywhere be best. 
3. International Law Fetishization 
The internationalists' preoccupation with full ratification of human 
rights treaties and with automatic domestic judicial control over their imple-
mentation is puzzling. Human rights treaties are not the product of demo-
cratic deliberation. Rather, they tend to be drafted by unaccountable 
bureaucrats that do not necessarily hail from rights-respecting States,52 and 
they tend to be written at a level of abstraction and compromise that is 
designed to maximize ratifications among very differently situated States. 
There is nothing inherently legitimate or necessarily optimal about the 
norms as worded in these treaties. 
The internationalist insistence that States must embrace human rights 
treaties' terms as written and enforce them domestically is all the more 
puzzling because there is no demonstrable relationship between the interna-
tionalists' desired state of affairs and genuine respect for human rights. Em-
pirical studies show no statistical relationship between human rights treaty 
ratification and either respect for human rights or improvement in human 
rights performance.53 (By contrast, empirical studies do find statistical rela-
tionships between democracy, peace, and developed economies, on the one 
hand, and protection of human rights, on the other.)54 Relatedly, as part I 
discussed, there is an inverse correlation between the number of reserva-
tions to the ICCPR and respect for human rights. The evidence in part I also 
suggested that there is no relationship whatsoever between the enforceabil-
51. Id. at art. 2(1). 
52. For example, the ICCPR was drafted by the UN Commission on Human Rights and the 
Third Committee of the UN General Assembly. 
53. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 Yale L.J. 
1935 (2002); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights: Does it Make A Difference? 36 J. Peace Research 95 (1999). 
54. Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 
1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 853 (1994); Steven C. Poe, The Decision to 
Repress: An Integrative Theoretical Approach to Research on Human Rights and Repression, in 
Understanding Human Rights Violations: New Systematic Studies 16 (Sabine C. Carey & Steven 
C. Poe eds., Ashgate 2004). 
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ity of international human rights law in domestic courts and genuine respect 
for human rights. 
This all suggests that in liberal democracies, something besides ratifi-
cation and incorporation of human rights treaties is doing the work when 
human rights flourish. In this light, it is unclear why internationalists are so 
insistent that the relatively successful U.S. human rights system fully em-
brace the ratification/incorporation project. 
A possible explanation for the insistence on full U.S. ratification and 
incorporation of universal human rights treaties is concern about the effect 
of the U.S. attitude to international human rights on countries in transition. 
Many scholars claim that the U.S. RUDs practice has bad effects on human 
rights in other countries, either because it gives other countries an excuse 
not to respect human rights, or because it undermines the United States' 
ability to exercise moral leadership in these countries.55 This concern, how-
ever, rests on the same misplaced belief in the importance of ratification 
and incorporation of human rights treaties that form the basis of the RUDs 
criticism in the first place. The fact is that there is no evidence that the 
United States' failure to consent fully to human rights treaties or make them 
enforceable in U.S. courts has any effect whatsoever on international 
human rights practices in other States. 
The United States began ratifying modern human rights treaties twenty 
years ago, and it has attached RUDs to all subsequent human rights treaties. 
During this same period, international human rights law has, by any mea-
sure, flourished. The claim that the U.S. RUDs practice harms the human 
rights movement becomes even less convincing when one considers the 
many ways that the United States influences human rights development 
around the world outside the context of the human rights treaties. The 
United States exerts much of its influence through the example of its own, 
non-treaty-based human rights standards, which RUDs have not diminished 
at all. The United States is also the nation that most aggressively pressures 
other nations to improve their human rights standards, through economic 
and military sanctions and through participation in international institutions. 
These practices once again are not affected by the RUDs. Probably the two 
greatest influences on the spread of human rights during the past twenty 
years has been the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War and eco-
nomic liberalization. The U.S. RUDs did not delay these accomplishments. 
In the end the internationalist position probably rests on a belief that 
preferred civil rights outcomes-in terms of, say, capital punishment and 
prison practices-would be better secured by a regime of full ratification 
55. See e.g. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the lnternatioanl Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 1169, 1173 
(Summer 1993); Lori F. Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Exe-
cuting" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 515, 515-16 (1991); Henkin, 
supra n. 1; Deliberative Democracy and Human Rights, supra n. 45. 
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and incorporation, This might be correct, but it might also not be, for rea-
sons stated above. But even taking the argument on its own terms, the argu-
ment is couched at the wrong level of abstraction. Yes, there is certainly 
room for improvement in the civil rights practices of liberal democracies. 
But across-the-board criticisms of RUDs and related practices are over-
broad formalistic arguments that do not get at what might or might not be 
wrong with these practices, 
